Abstract. We study the repeated, nonatomic congestion game, in which multiple populations of players share resources and make, at each iteration, a decentralized decision on which resources to utilize. We investigate the following question: given a model of how individual players update their strategies, does the resulting dynamics of strategy profiles converge to the set of Nash equilibria of the one-shot game? We consider in particular a model in which players update their strategies using algorithms with sublinear discounted regret. We show that the resulting sequence of strategy profiles converges to the set of Nash equilibria in the sense of Cesàro means. However, convergence of the actual sequence is not guaranteed in general. We show that it can be guaranteed for a class of algorithms with a sublinear discounted regret and which satisfy an additional condition. We call such algorithms AREP (approximate replicator) algorithms, as they can be interpreted as a discrete-time approximation of the replicator equation, which models the continuous-time evolution of population strategies, and which is known to converge for the class of congestion games.
1. Introduction. Congestion games are noncooperative games that model the interaction of players who share resources. Each player makes a decision on which resources to utilize. The individual decisions of players result in a resource allocation at the population scale. Resources which are highly utilized become congested, and the corresponding players incur higher losses. For example, in routing games-a subclass of congestion games-the resources are edges in a network, and each player needs to travel from a given source vertex to a given destination vertex on the graph. Each player chooses a path, and the joint decision of all players determines the congestion on each edge. The more a given edge is utilized, the more congested it is, creating delays for those players using that edge.
The one-shot congestion game has been studied extensively, and a comprehensive introduction is given, for example, in [25] . In particular, congestion games are shown to be convex potential games, thus their Nash equilibria can be expressed as the solution to a convex optimization problem. Characterizing the Nash equilibria of the congestion game gives useful insights, such as the loss of efficiency due to the selfishness of players. One popular measure of inefficiency is the price of anarchy, introduced by Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou in [20] and studied in the case of routing games by Roughgarden and Tardos in [26] . While characterizing Nash equilibria of the one-shot game gives After defining the model and giving preliminary results in sections 2 and 3, we show in section 4 that when players use online learning algorithms with sublinear discounted regret, the sequence of strategy profiles converges to the set of Nash equilibria in the Cesàro sense. In order to obtain strong convergence, we first motivate the study of the replicator dynamics. Indeed, it can be viewed as a continuous-time limit of the Hedge algorithm with decreasing learning rates. In section 5, we recall the convergence result of the replicator dynamics. By discretizing the replicator equation (using the same discount sequence (γ τ ) τ ∈N as discretization time steps) we obtain a multiplicative-weights update rule with sublinear discounted regret, which we call the REP (replicator) algorithm. Finally, in section 6, we define a class of online learning algorithms we call the AREP (approximate replicator) algorithms, which can be expressed as a discrete REP algorithm with perturbations that satisfy a condition given in Definition 6.8. Using results from the theory of stochastic approximation, we show that strong convergence is guaranteed for AREP algorithms with sublinear discounted regret. We finally observe that both the REP algorithm and the Hedge algorithm belong to this class, which proves convergence for these two algorithms in particular.
2. The congestion game model. In the congestion game, a finite set R of resources is shared by a set X of players. The set of players is endowed with a structure of measure space, (X , M, m), where M is a σ-algebra of measurable subsets, and m is a finite Lebesgue measure. The measure is nonatomic in the sense that singleplayer sets are null-sets for m. The player set is partitioned into K populations, X = X 1 ∪ · · · ∪ X K . For all k, the total mass of population X k is assumed to be finite and nonzero. Each player x ∈ X k has a task to perform, characterized by a collection of bundles P k ⊂ P, where P is the power set of R. The task can be accomplished by choosing any bundle of resources p ∈ P k . The action set of any player in X k is then simply P k .
The joint actions of all players can be represented by an action profile a : X → P such that for all x ∈ X k , a(x) ∈ P k is the bundle of resources chosen by player x. The function x → a(x) is assumed to be M-measurable (P is equipped with the counting measure). The action profile a determines the bundle loads and resource loads, defined as follows: for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K} and p ∈ P k , the load of bundle p under population X k is the total mass of players in X k who chose that bundle 
(a(x)=p) dm(x).
For any r ∈ R, the resource load is defined to be the total mass of players utilizing r
The resource loads determine the losses of all players: the loss associated to a resource r is given by c r (φ r (a)), where the congestion functions c r are assumed to satisfy the following. Assumption 2.1. The congestion functions c r are nonnegative, nondecreasing, Lipschitz-continuous functions.
The total loss of a player x such that a(x) = p is r∈p c r (φ r (a)). The congestion model is given by the tuple (K, (X k ) 1≤k≤K , R, (P k ) 1≤k≤K , (c r ) r∈R ). The congestion game is determined by the action set and the loss function for every player: for all x ∈ X k , the action set of x is P k , and the loss function of x, given the action profile a, is r∈a(x) c r (φ r (a) 
, and a bundle distribution across populations, given
We say that the action profile a induces the distribution μ(a). Here Δ P k denotes the simplex of distributions over P k , that is,
The product of simplexes Δ P1 ×· · ·×Δ PK will be denoted by Δ. This macroscopic representation of the joint actions of players will be useful in our analysis. We will also view the resource loads as linear functions of the product distribution μ(a). Indeed, we have from (2.2) and the definition of μ
where for all k, M k ∈ R R×P k is an incidence matrix defined as follows: for all r ∈ R and all p ∈ P k ,
, and by defining the scaled incidence matrixM = m(
By abuse of notation, the dependence on the action profile a will be omitted, so we will write μ instead of μ(a) and φ instead of φ(a). Finally, we define the loss function of a bundle p ∈ P k to be
Nash equilibria of the congestion game.
We can now define and characterize the Nash equilibria of the congestion game, also called Wardrop equilibria, in reference to [28] .
Definition 2.2 (Nash equilibrium). A product distribution μ is a Nash equilibrium of the congestion game if for all k, and all
The set of Nash equilibria will be denoted by N . In finite player games, a Nash equilibrium is defined to be an action profile a such that no player has an incentive to unilaterally deviate [23] , that is, no player can strictly decrease her loss by unilaterally changing her action. We show that this condition (referred to as the Nash condition) holds for almost all players whenever μ is a Nash equilibrium in the sense of Definition 2. 
Changing the action profile a on a null-set {x} does not affect the integral. Now, assume that almost all players have no incentive to unilaterally deviate. That is, for all k, for almost all x ∈ X k ,
where μ is the distribution obtained when x unilaterally changes her bundle from a(x) to p . By the previous observation, μ = μ. As a consequence, condition (2.4) becomes for almost all x, and for all p ,
implies that μ is a Nash equilibrium in the sense of Definition 2.2. Conversely, if a is an action profile, inducing distribution μ, such that the Nash condition does not hold for a set of players with positive measure, then there exists k 0 and a subset X ⊂ X k0 with m(X) > 0, such that every player in X can strictly decrease her loss by changing her action. Let X p = {x ∈ X : a(x) = p}; then X is the disjoint union X = ∪ p∈P k X p , and there exists p 0 such that m(X p0 ) > 0. Therefore
Let x ∈ X p0 . Since x can strictly decrease her loss by unilaterally changing her action, there exists p 1 such that
Definition 2.2 also implies that, for a population X k , all bundles with nonzero mass have equal losses, and bundles with zero mass have greater losses. Therefore almost all players incur the same loss.
Mixed strategies.
The Nash equilibria we have described so far are pure strategy equilibria, since each player x deterministically plays a single action a(x). We now extend the model to allow mixed strategies. That is, the action of a player x is a random variable A(x) with distribution π(x) and with realization a(x).
We show that when players use mixed strategies, provided they randomize independently, the resulting Nash equilibria are, in fact, the same as those given in Definition 2.2. The key observation is that under independent randomization, the resulting bundle distributions μ k are random variables with zero variance, and thus they are essentially deterministic.
To formalize the probabilistic setting, let (Ω, F , P) be a probability space. A mixed strategy profile is a function A : X → Ω → P, such that for all k and all
Similarly to the deterministic case, the mixed strategy profile A determines the bundle distributions μ k , which are, in this case, random variables, as we recall that μ
Nevertheless, assuming players randomize independently, the bundle distribution is almost surely equal to its expectation, as stated in the following proposition. The assumption of independent randomization is a reasonable one, since players are noncooperative. 
Proof. Fix k and let p ∈ P k . Since (x, ω) → 1 (A(x)=p) (ω) is a nonnegative bounded M × F-measurable function, we can apply Tonelli's theorem and write
Similarly,
-nullset (this follows, for example, from Proposition 251T in [13] ), we can restrict the integral to the set
, by the independent randomization assumption. This proves that var μ
The Rosenthal potential function.
We now discuss how one can formulate the set of Nash equilibria as the solution of a convex optimization problem. Consider the function
defined on the product of simplexes Δ P1 ×· · ·×Δ PK , which will be denoted by Δ. V is called the Rosenthal potential function and was introduced in [24] for the congestion game with finitely many players and later generalized to the infinite-players case. It can be viewed as the composition of the functionV : and V is a potential function for the congestion game, as defined in [27] , for example. Next, we show the relationship between the set of Nash equilibria and the potential function V . Theorem 2.5 (Rosenthal [24] ). N is the set of minimizers of V on the product of simplexes Δ. It is a nonempty convex compact set. We will denote by V N the value of V on N .
Since the set of Nash equilibria can be expressed as the solution to a convex optimization problem, it can be computed in polynomial time in the size of the problem. Beyond computing Nash equilibria, we seek to model how players arrive at the set N . This is discussed in section 3. But first, we define routing games, a special case of congestion games.
Example: Routing games.
A routing game is a congestion game with an underlying graph G = (V, E), with vertex set V and edge set E ⊂ V × V. In this case, the resource set is equal to the edge set, R = E. Routing games are used to model congestion on transportation or communication networks. Each population X k is characterized by a common source vertex s k ∈ V and a common destination vertex t k ∈ V. In a transportation setting, players represent drivers traveling from s k to t k ; in a communication setting, players send packets from s k to t k . The action set P k is a set of paths connecting s k to t k . In other words, each player chooses a path connecting his or her source and destination vertices. The bundle load f k p is then called the flow on path p. The resource load φ r is called the total edge flow. Finally, the congestion functions φ r → c r (φ r ) determine the delay (or latency) incurred by each player.
We will use the routing game given in Figure 1 as an example to illustrate the convergence result of section 6. In this example, two populations of players share the network; the first population sends packets from v 0 to v 1 , and the second population from v 2 to v 3 . The paths (bundles) available to each population are given by
3. Online learning in congestion games. We now describe the online learning framework for the congestion game and present the Hedge algorithm in particular.
The online learning framework.
Suppose that the game is played repeatedly for infinitely many iterations, indexed by τ ∈ N. During iteration τ , each player chooses a bundle simultaneously. The decision of all players can be represented, as defined above, by an action profile a (τ ) : X → P. This induces, at the level of each population X k , a bundle distribution μ k (τ ) . These, in turn, determine the resource loads and the bundle losses
The losses for bundles p ∈ P k are revealed to all players in population X k , which marks the end of iteration τ . Players can then use this information to update their strategies before the start of the next iteration. Downloaded 06/27/16 to 128.32.196.84. Redistribution subject to SIAM license or copyright; see http://www.siam.org/journals/ojsa.php A note on the information assumptions. Here, we assume that at the end of the iteration, a player observes the losses of all bundles p ∈ P k . Instead, one could assume that a player can only observe the losses she incurs. This is often called the multiarmed-bandit setting, in reference to armed-bandit slot machines, in which a gambler can choose, at each iteration, one machine to play and is only revealed the loss of that machine. Making this restriction requires players to use additional exploration of bundles. A comprehensive presentation of online learning algorithms in the multiarmed-bandit setting, both stochastic and deterministic, can be found, for example, in [2] . Regret bounds are also given in [10, Section 6.7, pp. 156-159], and [9, 8] , as well as [3, 15] for the online shortest path problem. We choose to use the full feedback assumption to simplify our discussion, leaving the multiarmed-bandit setting as a possible extension. We believe this is a reasonable model in many games, since bundle losses could be announced publicly. In the special case of routing games, this can be achieved by having a central authority measure and announce the delays. This is particularly true in transportation networks, in which many agencies and online services measure delays and make this information publicly available. Assuming the full vector of bundle losses is revealed does not mean, however, that players have access to the individual resource loads φ (τ ) r , or to the congestion functions c r (·), which is consistent with our initial argument that, in a realistic model, players should only rely on the observed value of the bundle losses.
Each player x ∈ X k is assumed to draw her bundle from a randomized strategy π (τ ) (x) ∈ Δ P k (the deterministic case is a special case in which π (τ ) (x) is a vertex on the simplex, i.e., a pure strategy). As discussed in section 2.3, players randomize independently. At the end of iteration τ , player x updates her strategy using an update rule or online learning algorithm, as defined below.
Definition 3.1 (online learning algorithm for the congestion game). An online learning algorithm (or update rule) for the congestion game, applied by a player x ∈ X k , is a sequence of functions U
, fixed a priori, that is, before the start of the game, such that for each τ ,
is a function which maps, given the history of bundle losses ( k (μ (t) )) t≤τ , the strategy on the current day π (τ ) (x) to the strategy on the next day π (τ +1) (x). The online learning framework is summarized in Algorithm 1. Algorithm 1. Online learning framework for the congestion game.
1: For every player x ∈ P k , an initial mixed strategy
Every player x independently draws a bundle according to her strategy
The vector of bundle losses k (μ (τ ) ) is revealed to all players in P k . Each player incurs the loss of the bundle she chose.
5:
Players update their mixed strategies: We will focus our attention on algorithms which have vanishing upper bounds on the average discounted regret, defined in the next section.
Discounted regret.
Since the game is played for infinitely many iterations, we assume that the losses of players are discounted over time. This is a common technique in infinite-horizon optimal control, for example, and can be motivated from an economic perspective by considering that losses are devalued over time. We also give an interpretation of discounting in terms of learning rates, as discussed in section 3.4.
Let (γ τ ) τ ∈N denote the sequence of discount factors. We make the following assumption.
Assumption 3.2. The sequence of discount factors (γ τ ) τ ∈N is assumed to be positive decreasing with lim τ →∞ γ τ = 0 and lim T →∞
, where μ (τ ) is the distribution induced by the profile A (τ ) . The cumulative discounted loss for player x, up to iteration T , is then defined to be
We observe that this is a random variable, since the action A (τ ) (x) of player x is random, drawn from a distribution π (τ ) (x). The expectation of the cumulative discounted
where ·, · denotes the Euclidean inner product on R P k . Similarly, we define the cumulative discounted loss for a fixed bundle
We can now define the discounted regret. Definition 3.3 (discounted regret). Let x ∈ X k , and consider an online learning algorithm for the congestion game, given by the sequence of functions U 
The algorithm U is said to have sublinear discounted regret if for any sequence of distributions (μ (τ ) ) τ ∈N , and any initial strategy π (0) ,
If we have convergence in the L 1 -norm,
we say that the algorithm has sublinear discounted regret in expectation.
We observe that in the definition of the regret, one can replace the minimum over the set P k by a minimum over the simplex
, since the minimizers of a bounded linear function lie on the set of extremal points Downloaded 06/27/16 to 128.32.196.84. Redistribution subject to SIAM license or copyright; see http://www.siam.org/journals/ojsa.php of the feasible set. Therefore, the discounted regret compares the performance of the online learning algorithm to the best stationary strategy in hindsight. Indeed, π, L (T ) is the cumulative discounted loss of a stationary strategy π, and minimizing this expression over π ∈ Δ P k yields the best stationary strategy in hindsight: one cannot know a priori which strategy will minimize the expression until all losses up to T are revealed. If the algorithm has sublinear regret, its average performance is, asymptotically, as good as the performance of any stationary strategy, regardless of the sequence of distributions (μ (τ ) ) τ ∈N .
A note on monotonicity of the discount factors. A similar definition of discounted regret is used, for example, by Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi in section 3.2 of [10] . However, in their definition, the sequence of discount factors is increasing. This can be motivated by the following argument: present observations may provide better information than past, stale observations. While this argument is accurate in many applications, it does not serve our purpose of convergence of population strategies. In our discussion, the standing assumption is that discount factors are decreasing.
Finally, we observe that the cumulative discounted loss and regret are bounded, uniformly in x, since the congestion functions are continuous on a compact set.
Proposition 3.4. There exists ρ ≥ 0 such that for all k, all p ∈ P k , and all μ ∈ Δ,
Populationwide regret. We have defined the discounted regret R (T ) (x) for a single player x.
In order to analyze the population dynamics, we define a populationwide cumulative discounted loss L k (T ) and discounted regret R k (T ) as follows:
is also a random variable. However, it is, in fact, almost surely equal to its expectation. Indeed, recalling that μ k p (τ ) is the proportion of players who chose bundle p at iteration τ (also a random variable), we can write
thus assuming players randomize independently, μ (τ ) is almost surely deterministic by Proposition 2.4, and so is L k (T ) . The same holds for R k (T ) .
Proposition 3.5. If almost every player x ∈ X k applies an online learning algorithm with sublinear regret in expectation, then the populationwide regret is also sublinear.
Proof. By the previous observation, we have, almost surely, 
By assumption,
+ converges to 0 for all x, and by Proposition 3.4, it is bounded uniformly in x. Thus the result follows by applying the dominated convergence theorem.
Hedge algorithm with vanishing learning rates.
We now present one particular online learning algorithm with sublinear regret. Consider a congestion game, and let ρ be an upper bound on the losses. The existence of such an upper bound was established in Proposition 3.4.
Definition 3.6 (Hedge algorithm). The Hedge algorithm, applied by player x ∈ X k , with initial distribution π (0) ∈ Δ P k and learning rates (η τ ) τ ∈N , is an online learning algorithm ( U x (τ ) ) τ ∈N such that the τ th update function is given by
Intuitively, the Hedge algorithm updates the distribution by computing, at each iteration, a set of bundle weights, then normalizing the vector of weights. The weight of a bundle p is obtained by multiplying the probability at the previous iteration, π (τ ) p , by a term which is exponentially decreasing in the bundle loss k p (μ (τ ) ); thus the higher the loss of bundle p at iteration τ , the lower the probability of selecting p at the next iteration. The parameter η τ can be interpreted as a learning rate, as the Hedge update rule (3.7) is the solution to the following optimization problem:
where D KL (π ν) = p∈P k π p log πp νp is the Kullback-Leibler divergence of distribution π with respect to ν (see, for example, [18] ).
The objective function in (3.8) is the sum of an instantaneous loss term π,
and a regularization term
) which penalizes deviations from the previous distribution π (τ ) , with a regularization coefficient 1 ητ . The greedy problem (with no regularization term) would yield a pure strategy which concentrates all the mass on the bundle which had minimal loss on the previous iteration. With the regularization term, the player "hedges her bet" by penalizing too much deviation from the previous distribution. The coefficient η τ determines the relative importance of the two terms in the objective function. In particular, as η τ → 0, the solution to the problem (3.8) converges to π (τ ) since the regularization term dominates the instantaneous loss term. In other words, as η τ converges to 0, the player stops learning from new observations, which justifies calling η τ a learning rate. 
where π
The last inequality follows from Hoeffding's lemma, since 0 ≤
where ξ(L (−1) ) = ξ(0) = 0. By monotonicity of the log function, we have for all 
and we obtain the desired inequality by maximizing both sides over p 0 ∈ P k . The previous proposition provides an upper bound on the expected regret of the Hedge algorithm, of the form
Given Assumption 3.2 on the discount factors, we have lim T →∞
τ ≤T γ 2 τ τ ≤T γτ = 0, which proves that the discounted regret is sub-linear. This also provides a bound on the convergence rate. For example, if γ τ ∼ 1 τ , then the upper bound is equivalent to c log T , which converges to zero as T → ∞, albeit slowly. A better bound can be obtained for sequences of discount factors which are not square-summable, for example, taking
, the upper bound is equivalent to c log T √ T . We now have one example of an online learning algorithm with sublinear discounted regret. Furthermore, we have an interpretation of the sequence (γ τ ) as learning rates, which provides additional intuition on Assumption 3.2 on (γ τ ): decreasing the learning rates will help the system converge.
In the next section, we start our analysis of the population dynamics when all players apply a learning algorithm with sublinear discounted regret.
Convergence in the Cesàro sense.
As discussed in Proposition 3.5, if almost every player applies an algorithm with sublinear discounted regret in expectation, then the populationwide discounted regret is sublinear (almost surely). We now show that whenever the population has sublinear discounted regret, the sequence of distributions (μ (τ ) ) τ converges in the sense of Cesàro. That is, τ ≤T γ τ μ (τ ) / τ ≤T γ τ converges to the set of Nash equilibria. We also show that we have convergence of a dense subsequence. First, we give some definitions.
Definition 4.1 (convergence in the sense of Cesàro). Fix a sequence of positive weights
(γ τ ) τ ∈N . A sequence (u (τ ) ) τ ∈N of
elements of a normed vector space (F, · ) converges to u ∈ F in the sense of Cesàro means with respect to
The Stolz-Cesàro theorem states that if (u (τ ) ) τ converges to u, then it converges in the sense of Cesàro means with respect to any nonsummable sequence (γ τ ) τ ; see, for example, [22] . The converse is not true in general. However, if a sequence converges absolutely in the sense of Cesàro means, i.e., u
− −− → 0, then a dense subsequence of (u (τ ) ) τ converges to u. To show this, we first show that absolute Cesàro convergence implies statistical convergence, as defined below. Proof. Let > 0. We have for all T ∈ N,
, which converges to 0 since (u (τ ) ) τ converges to u absolutely in the sense of Cesàro means. Therefore I has zero density for all .
We can now show convergence of a dense subsequence. Proposition 4.4. If (u (τ ) ) τ ∈N converges to u absolutely in the sense of Cesàro means with respect to (γ τ ), then there exists a subset of indexes T ⊂ N of density one, such that the subsequence (u (τ ) ) τ ∈T converges to u. Proof. By Lemma 4.3, for all > 0, the set I = {τ ∈ N : u (τ ) − u ≥ } has zero density. We will construct a set I ⊂ N of zero density, such that the
which proves that I has zero density. Let T = N \ I. We have that T has density one, and it remains to prove that the subsequence (u (τ ) ) τ ∈T converges to u. Since T has density one, it has infinitely many elements, and for all k, there exists
k . This proves that (u (τ ) ) τ ∈T converges to u. We now present the main result of this section, which concerns the convergence of a subsequence of population distributions (μ (τ ) ) to the set N of Nash equilibria. We say that (μ 
Consider the potential function V defined in (2.5). By convexity of V and the expression (2.6) of its gradient, we have for all τ and for all μ ∈ Δ,
then taking the weighted sum up to iteration T ,
where for the last inequality, we use the fact that
In particular, when μ is a Nash equilibrium, by Theorem 2.5, V (μ) = min μ∈Δ V (μ) = V N , and thus
Since the populationwide regret R k (T ) is assumed to be sublinear for all k, we have
− −− → 0. By Proposition 4.4, there exists T ⊂ N of density one, such that (V (μ (τ ) )) τ ∈T converges to V N . And it follows that (μ (τ ) ) τ ∈T converges to N . This proves the second part of the theorem. To prove the first part, we observe that, by convexity of V ,
, and the upper bound converges to V N . Therefore
To conclude this section, we observe that the Cesàro convergence result of Theorem 4.5 can be generalized to any game with a convex potential function.
Continuous-time dynamics.
We now turn to the harder question of convergence of (μ (τ ) ) τ : we seek to derive sufficient conditions under which the sequence (μ (τ ) ) converges to N . In this section, we study a continuous-time limit of the update equation given by the Hedge algorithm. The resulting ODE, known as the replicator equation, will be useful in proving strong convergence results in the next section.
The replicator dynamics.
To motivate the study of the replicator dynamics from an online learning point of view, we first derive the continuous-time replicator dynamics as a limit of the discrete Hedge dynamics, as discussed below. Assume that in each population X k , all players start from the same initial distribution π k (0) ∈ Δ P k , and apply the Hedge algorithm with learning rates (γ τ ). (t 0 ) = 0. Since the solution trajectories are continuous, we can assume, without loss of generality, that t 0 is the infimum of all such times (thus for all t < t 0 , µ p0 (t) > 0). Now consider the new system given bẏ
andμ p0 (t) is identically equal to 0. Any solution of the new system, defined on (t 0 − δ, t 0 ], is also a solution of (5.1). Since µ(t 0 ) =μ(t 0 ), we have µ ≡μ by uniqueness of the solution. This leads to a contradiction since by assumption, for all t < t 0 , µ p (t) > 0 butμ p (t) = 0. This proves that µ remains inΔ. Furthermore, since Δ is compact, we have by Theorem 2.4 in [17] that the solution is defined on R + (otherwise it would eventually leave any compact set).
Stationary points of the replicator dynamics.
We first give a characterization of stationary points of the replicator dynamics applied to the congestion game. A stationary point μ with support P 1 × · · · × P K can be viewed as a Nash equilibrium of a modified congestion game, in which the bundle set of each population X k is restricted to P k . For this reason, stationary points have been called restricted Nash equilibria by Fischer and Vöcking in [11] . We will denote the set of stationary points by RN , in reference to the aforementioned paper.
Remark 5.3. By the previous observation, a stationary point with support P 1 × · · · × P K is a minimizer of the potential function V on the product Δ P 1 × · · · × Δ P K . As the number of support sets is finite, the set of potential values of stationary points V (RN ) is also finite.
Convergence of the replicator dynamics.
In [11] , Fischer and Vöcking prove, using a Lyapunov argument, that all solution trajectories of the replicator system asymptotically approach the set of stationary points RN . Unfortunately, this result only guarantees convergence to a superset of Nash equilibria. However, this will be useful in the next section.
Proposition 5.4 (Fischer and Vöcking [11] ). Every solution of the system (5.1) converges to the set of stationary points RN .
A discrete-time replicator equation:
The REP update rule. Inspired by the continuous-time replicator dynamics, we propose a discrete-time multiplicative update rule by discretizing the ODE (5.1). The resulting algorithm has many desirable properties, such as sublinear discounted regret and simplicity of implementation. We call it the REP algorithm in reference to the replicator ODE. 
Then, condition 1 of Proposition 6.2 holds with probability one.
Chain transitivity.
We next give an important property of limit points of bounded APTs, given in Theorem 6.6. In the remainder of this section, let Γ ⊂ D be a compact invariant set for Φ, that is, Φ t (Γ) ⊆ Γ for all t ∈ R + .
Definition 6.5 (internally chain transitive set). The compact invariant set Γ is internally chain transitive if the restriction of Φ to Γ is chain transitive. Theorem 6.6 (Theorem 5.7 in [4] ). Let X be a bounded APT of (6.1 , then μ (τ ) → N . Proof. The REP update rule is a discounted no-regret algorithm by Proposition 5.7, and it is an AREP algorithm with zero perturbations, so we can apply Theorem 6.10.
Corollary 6.12. If (μ (τ ) ) obeys the discounted Hedge update rule with learning rates γ τ satisfying Assumption 3.2, then μ (τ ) → N . Proof. By Propositions 3.8 and 6.9, the discounted Hedge algorithm with rates γ τ is an AREP algorithm with sublinear discounted regret, and we can apply Theorem 6.10.
We illustrate this convergence result with a routing game on the example network introduced in section 2.5. We simulate the population dynamics under the discounted Hedge algorithm with a harmonic sequence of learning rates, γ τ = 20 10+τ . The results are shown in Figure 3 . Downloaded 06/27/16 to 128.32.196.84. Redistribution subject to SIAM license or copyright; see http://www.siam.org/journals/ojsa.php 7. Conclusion. We studied the convergence of online learning dynamics in the nonatomic congestion game. We showed that dynamics with sublinear discounted population regret guarantee the convergence of (μ (τ ) ), the sequence of Cesàro means of population strategies. To obtain convergence of the actual sequence of strategies (μ (τ ) ), we introduced the AREP class of approximate replicator dynamics, inspired by the replicator ODE. We showed that whenever the population strategies obey an AREP dynamics and have sublinear discounted regret, the sequence converges. These results assume that the sequence of discount factors (γ τ ) is identical for all players. One question is whether this assumption can be relaxed, so that different players can use different learning rates.
